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ABSTRACT
This research simulates agricultural exports of four major crops from 1996-2004.
Export value and volume is evaluated in relation to historical performance, as are potential
implications of alternative assumptions about world trade expectations.  The paper also
highlights potential export ramifications of current FAIR Act policy provisions.
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U.S. Agricultural Exports: Projected Changes Under FAIR
and Potential Unanticipated Changes
INTRODUCTION
United States (U.S.) agricultural exports are projected to exceed $56 billion in
1997 (USDA, 1997).  Exports play a significant role in determining the level and stability
of  domestic crop net returns, as do expectations about future export demand.  To a large
extent, the nature of long-run projections for agriculture is based on assumptions about
exports.  However, long-run export prediction must contend with a great deal of
uncertainty.
The primary objective of this research is to estimate projected changes in export
volume and value under provisions of the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and
Reform (FAIR) Act for four major agricultural export commodities.  Projections are
evaluated in the context of historical performance of export volume and value.
Additionally, the research seeks to identify assumptions embedded in such an analysis that
may significantly influence export projections, and quantify changes in export value
projections resulting from varying these assumptions.  The analysis shows that current
projections are sensitive to trade and market assumptions regarding China’s corn imports
and the European Union’s (EU) wheat exports.  Finally, the paper assesses potential
export implications of specific elements of the FAIR Act.
METHODOLOGY
Analytical Tools and Baseline Assumptions
The baseline assumptions for all analyses, including macroeconomic indicators,
input prices, economic and environmental policies, and numerous other variables, are4
based on research conducted by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
(FAPRI).  These assumptions and the resulting baseline U.S. agricultural projections for
1996 to 2004 under a post-FAIR policy environment were published in May 1996.  In July
1996, FAPRI released updated crop supply and utilization estimates for the 1996-98 crop
years, but with no connection linking the updated estimates to the 1999-2004 estimates
previously reported.
In light of the updated estimates, a POLYSYS simulation was conducted using
the FAPRI assumptions and revised estimates to estimate noncrop-specific economic
indicators, stock carry-overs and expected prices for 1996-1998 period.  These
POLYSYS results were then used to simulate changes from FAPRI’s May 1996 baseline
for the 1999-2004 period.  Projections for this analysis are a combination of 1996 revised
FAPRI baseline estimates for 1996-1998 and POLYSYS estimates based on the revised
FAPRI data for the period 1999-2004.
Alternative Scenario Assumptions
One assumption embedded in the baseline scenario is that China will significantly
increase its level of corn imports beyond the crop year 2000.  Historically, China has been
a net exporter of corn.  But in 1994, China shifted from exporting 10.5 to importing 4.1
million metric tons of corn.  The baseline assumes that China corn imports will remain
near or below the 1994 level through crop year 2000, beyond which, China is expected to
double the 1994 level by 2002, and triple the 1994 level in 2004.  The assumption is based
on a projection of annual GDP growth in China between 8 and 9 percent throughout the
period, implying higher personal income and associated dietary changes.  As consumption
demand for meat increases, so will feed requirements, particularly corn.  However,5
cultural, political and economic conditions introduce additional uncertainty for the GDP
growth assumption.
The projected level of China corn imports by the year 2004 is approximately 30%
of U.S. corn exports for the crop year 1996.  Thus, predicting such a significant import
increase for China could impact projections for U.S. corn exports.  Since predicted corn
imports for China have the potential to influence world corn trade and since the prediction
is an estimate with associated variation and error, an alternative projection for U.S. corn
exports is modeled under the assumption that China corn imports will remain near their
2000 level (approximately 8 million metric tons) through 2004.
Another baseline assumption is that the EU will be able to profitably export wheat
without export subsidies by the year 2000.  Over the period 1983-1990, the EU exported
an average of 0.56 billion bushels of wheat annually.  Over the period 1991-1996, this
average rose 14 percent to 0.64 billion bushels.  The baseline assumes that EU wheat
exports will increase to an annual average of 0.85 billion bushels beyond 2000, which is
more than a 50 percent increase over the 1996 level.  Such an increase would certainly
impact world wheat markets, and would likely reduce U.S. wheat exports and world
wheat prices.  To gauge the effect of the EU wheat export assumption, an alternative
scenario was considered in which U.S. wheat export demand is assumed to increase over
the period 2001 to 2004 at a rate that will return the U.S. share of world wheat trade back
to its 1998-9 average by 2004.
RESULTS
Baseline Crop Export Volume and Value6
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 present the historical volume and value of corn, wheat,
soybeans, and upland cotton exports since 1980, and projections from 1996-2004 under
FAIR provisions.  Export value data (volume multiplied by price) are calculated by crop
year rather than fiscal year to keep projections consistent with the historical data in Ray et
al (1994).  Generally, exports for corn increase significantly over the projected period,
while wheat and soybean exports initially rise, then decline beyond 2000, and cotton
exports remain well below 1994 levels.
Framing the examination of the export projections in the context of historical
export performance may provide insight useful for analyzing the projections.  The case of
corn value exports illustrates three generalities that may be extended to other crops.  First,
contrary to what economists were implying in the mid- and late -1980’s, the peaks in value
of exports tend to be associated with years in which prices are relatively “high” and the
troughs tend to be years in which prices are relatively “low”.  Peaks in the 1980, 1983,
and 1995 crop years occur when corn prices exceed $3.00; troughs in crop years 1986,
1992, and 1999 occur when corn prices are $1.50, $2.07, and $2.22, respectively.
Export values rise when there is a rightward shift in export demand which
increases price and, hence, the product of volume and price.  Conversely, a leftward shift
in demand reduces prices and value.  The data suggest that moving down the demand
curve with lower prices does not generate more export revenue.  The experience of the
1980’s would leave little doubt that grain export demand is price inelastic.  In fact, even
though trade liberalization may have eased its price inelasticity somewhat, it seems
plausible to think that major grain exports are presently at least as price inelastic as during7
the 1950’s and 1960’s, a period when agricultural economists explained the existence of
farm programs based on inelastic demand and supply in agriculture.
The primary factor influencing the continued inelasticity of grain exports is market
structure.  The role of the U.S. is either the dominant market force - as is the case with
corn - or one of a small number of forces in a well-developed oligopolistic market, as is
the case for wheat and soybeans.  Recent history has shown that within days (if not hours)
of a U.S. price adjustment, the marketing boards of the EU, Canada, Australia, and Brazil
respond with similar adjustments.  The net result of such a rapid reaction is a virtually
unchanged allotment of world market shares.  Since the total volume of exports increases
proportionately less than price declines, export earnings for all market players decline.
Traders, transporters and input providers benefit from the increased volume, but U.S.
grain producers experience a revenue reduction.
Second, the steep climb in corn exports experienced between 1992 and 1995 will
not continue.  Given the conditions in the early fall of 1996, it is expected that corn export
volume actually will decline from its 1995 level through 1998 and then recover to its 1995
level in 1999 before increasing again in the early years of the next century.  Because prices
fall during the early period and recover more slowly, the value of corn exports shows an
exaggeration of this pattern.  Much of the increase in export volume after the year 2000 is
due to expected increased export demand from China, the effect of which is considered in
more detail below.
Third, while crop-year corn export value has increased in recent years, it took
fifteen years to reach its 1980 value.  In fact, on a crop-year basis, the 1995 value (which
was heavily influenced by the run-up in prices in mid-1996), is slightly under the 19808
value.  Perhaps even more surprising is that after 1995, it takes until 2004 to again reach
the 1980 (and 1995) crop-year value of corn exports.
The export situation is nearly the same for soybeans but is even less favorable for
wheat and cotton.  The 1995 crop-year value of soybean exports ($5.68 billion) nearly
equals its historical 1983 level ($5.82 billion) then it declines to the 2000 crop year ($4.6
billion) and gradually increases to somewhat less than its 1983 value in 2004 ($5.48
billion).  Although wheat export value for the 1995 crop-year ($5.62 billion) is well above
recent years, it is $1 billion below its record level of $6.53 billion in 1983.  Wheat export
value falls after 1995 but unlike corn and soybeans, it does not recover at the end of the
projection period (30 percent below the 1995 value at $3.88 billion in 2004).  In the case
of cotton, the crop-year historical record for export value was in 1994 at $3.13 billion.
Cotton export value declines to $2.75 billion in the 1995 crop year and drops to $2 billion
by 1997, remaining near that level for the rest of the period.  Hence, by the end of the
projection period, both wheat and cotton export values are about two-thirds of their 1995
or 1994 value.
Alternative Chinese Corn Import Assumption
As seen in Figure 5, the projected increase in U.S. corn exports over the 1997-
2004 period moves parallel to the expected increase in China imports.  In Figure 6, the
change in the assumption about China’s import projections results in corn prices remaining
relatively flat after the year 2000, rather than curving upward as in the baseline simulation.
Corn prices are down by $0.20 per bushel in 2004.  Over the 2002 to 2004 crop years,
corn farmers are expected to lose about $5.5 billion dollars, a 9 percent reduction.9
Alternative European Union Wheat Export Assumption
As seen in Figure 7, the expectation that the EU will be able to profitably export
wheat without export subsidies by 2000 contributes to flat U.S. wheat exports in the latter
portion of the projection period and to wheat prices that continue to drop through 2003.
Under the alternative assumption that U.S. wheat export demand increases from 2001-
2004, the U.S. share of world wheat trade returns to its 1998-99 average.  Wheat prices
and net returns increase significantly under the alternative assumption, as seen in Figure 8.
Wheat prices increase by $0.18 per bushel in 2001 and by $0.60 per bushel in 2003 and
2004.  Over the period 2001 to 2004, increased exports and prices boost net income to
wheat farmers by 27 percent or $4.5 billion.
ASSESSING IMPLICATIONS OF 1996 FAIR ACT PROVISIONS
Before discussing export projections in the context of farm programs and the 1996
FAIR legislation, a review of the sources of year-to-year export variations and the
fundamental, long-term determinants of export demand is in order.  Short-run export
demand variation is influenced by changes in prices, exchange rates, credit arrangements,
country-specific trade policies, and a host of other factors.  But the primary force that
drives annual variation around expected trade flows is fluctuation in yields and production.
In the case of a country which produces a significant share of its demand
requirements, short-run changes in imports above or below expected levels are largely
dependent on crop yields in the current production period.  Similarly, changes in export
competitors’ excess supply available for export - above or below expected levels - are also
largely determined by yield and production variation.  Hence, the lion’s share of the
variation in export demand for U.S. commodities around expected levels is due to10
production shortfalls/bumper crops either in net importing countries or countries that are
U.S. competitors in the world export market.
Baseline U.S. grain exports are determined by population (especially in developed
countries), per-capita incomes (especially in less-developed countries), consumer
preferences, long-and short-term credit arrangements, international and country-specific
trade policies, and other demand-related factors.  On the supply-side, dependability as a
supplier is important, and the agricultural productivity of the U.S.’s export customers and
competitors (whether that productivity is market or politically driven) can greatly affect
U.S. grain export demand.
In general, farm program mechanisms such as acreage diversion or other
acreage/production restrictions, base acreages, buffer stock programs, price levels relative
to competitors, export subsidies, and other features of farm legislation and programs can
affect the short-term availability of U.S. grain for exports.  Some provisions affect
exportable supplies positively (e.g., buffer stocks) and others negatively (e.g., base
acreage planting requirements, acreage or production restrictions, non-competitive prices).
In the long-run, commodity programs can affect the long-term availability of exportable
supplies if farm programs influence agriculture’s ability to create and maintain excess
capacity.  By and large, the level of productive capacity of agriculture is determined by
technology.  To the extent that farm programs provide a stable price and income
environment which encourages farmers and their bankers to invest in new capital-intensive
technologies, farm programs could expand the productive capacity of agriculture.
Maintenance of diverted acreage which can revert to productive use relatively quickly also
can allow farmers to capture a larger share of an exploding export market.11
The FAIR Act performs will in terms of farmer’s ability to respond to export
markets by changing the mix of commodities.  Producers are free to change crop mixes as
market conditions suggest or as export markets emerge.  Also, the CRP serves, in part, as
a store of excess productive capacity that could be brought on-line if needed.  Further
provisions such as establishment of land trusts to preserve agricultural land and prevent
future development outside agriculture also contribute to agriculture’s new freedom to
respond to changing export markets.
However, some provisions of the FAIR Act concurrently reduce the U.S.’s ability
to quickly respond to changes in export situations.  The legislation provides no
commitment to maintaining buffer stocks.  Marketing loans continue and are likely to be
used to ensure little or no accumulation of Commodity Credit Corporation-owned grain
and cotton stocks and the Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve is suspended.  Additionally, no
short-term diversions are available to respond to a spurt in export demand.  Hence,
tremendous variations in prices and income are possible under FAIR.  If a tight domestic
supply-demand situation was to occur and export customers even perceived a U.S. export
embargo to be plausible, their food self-sufficiency goals would be intensified, encouraging
export customers to arrange formal grain-delivery commitments with U.S. competitors.
Even before the summer of 1996, when the price of corn shot up to $5 per bushel
and then fell below $2.35 within a 5 month time span, if there was one thing that analysts
agreed on about the new legislation it was that it would subject agriculture to increased
price and income risk.  Also, if there is any agreement on how firms deal with risk, it is
that firm operators are unable to use the post-hoc most-efficient combinations of resources12
to produce the optimal mix of products in the short-run and that increased risk inhibits the
adoption and banker financing of new, usually capital-intensive, technologies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Under baseline assumptions, this research projects volume and value of corn
exports to steadily increase over the next 8 years.  Over the same period, wheat and
soybean exports are projected to rise initially, then declined early next century, while
cotton exports remain fairly constant well below 1994 levels.  Examination of the
projections in their historical context provides further support for price inelasticity in
export demand.  One factor significantly influencing the corn projection was shown to be
an assumption that China will significantly increase imports beyond 2000.  Holding the
expected import level constant at its 2000 level significantly reduces the export projection.
Similarly, temperance of the expectation of increased EU wheat exports beyond 2000
tempers the decline in U.S. wheat export volume and value beyond 2000.
Provisions of the 1996 FAIR Act are expected to influence U.S. ability to respond
to changing export markets.  Elements of the legislation that increase production flexibility
and preserve excess productive capacity will facilitate producer response to changing
world market conditions or emergent markets.  However, other elements will
simultaneously limit U.S. ability to quickly respond to changing conditions.  In the short-
run, virtual elimination of buffer stocks will further exacerbate price and income variation.
Potential tightening of the domestic supply and demand relationship may also influence
export response.  In the long run, increased price and income risk resulting from a FAIR
Act policy environment may inhibit technological development and adoption.13
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